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Abstract
Much of the discussion of set-theoretic independence, and whether or not we
could legitimately expand our foundational theory, concerns how we could possi-
bly come to know the truth value of independent sentences. This paper pursues
a slightly different tack, examining how we are ignorant of issues surrounding
their truth. We argue that a study of how we are ignorant reveals a need for an
understanding of set-theoretic explanation and motivates a pluralism concerning
the adoption of foundational theory.
Introduction
It is well-known that many statements of set theory cannot be either proved or dis-
proved on the basis of the ZFC axioms. Some have seen this as indicative of a failure
of our concept of set to determine a single Universe of sets rather than a Multiverse
of different universes (we shall see some discussion of these views later).
Much of the discussion surrounding independence focusses on whether or not
we could come to know set-theoretic sentences independent of ZFC, and if so, how.1
In this paper, we examine a slightly different question: what is our ignorance of
independent sentences like? Assuming that we do not know the answers to questions
independent from ZFC, how should we understand this ignorance? How, if at all,
might this influence any pluralism concerning set-theoretic foundation?
Our strategy is as follows. First (§1) we note two different kinds of indepen-
dence, those that are sensitive to large cardinal axioms, and those that are not. We
pick two well-studied examples from the literature: Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis
(henceforth ‘CH’) and Projective Determinacy (henceforth ‘PD’). We then (§2) present
two views concerning set-theoretic ontology (Multiversism and Universism), and
explain how each might be linked to the acceptance or rejection of a Pluralism in set-
theoretic foundations. Next (§3), we change tack and exposit some literature on the
study of ignorance (often called agnotology). We then (§4), examine how various po-
sitions might regard our ignorance of CH and PD. Finally (§5), we argue that certain
views of our ignorance of independent sentences motivates pluralism concerning the
study of set-theoretic foundations, even on a Universist picture. We conclude that
despite the prima facie tension between Universism and Pluralism, the character of
our ignorance suggests a fusion of the two positions.
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1 Varieties of independence
Before we go further we should be precise about two different kinds of indepen-
dence we might see. A natural question, once one is aware of Cantor’s Theorem that
there is no bijection between a set and its powerset, is whether or not there is an
intermediate cardinality between that of the natural numbers and its powerset. The
hypothesis that there is no such cardinal number is known as Cantor’s Continuum
Hypothesis (or ‘CH’), and can be coded as a statement of third-order arithmetic.
However, independence from ZFC comes before the level of third-order arith-
metic, yielding a different kind of independence. Determinacy axioms concern strate-
gies (represented as functions) for generating reals, and can be played over certain
subsets of the reals (where one player wins if the real generated is in the relevant
subset, where the other wins if the real is not in the subset). For example, Projective
Determinacy is the statement that any projectively defined set of reals has a winning
strategy. PD can be coded as a (schematic) statement of second-order arithmetic.2
There are a number of arguments both for and against CH and PD in themselves3.
Important for our purposes, however, will be the relationship between these princi-
ples and large cardinals.4 There is no formal definition of a large cardinal axiom,
however there are a family of natural principles that index consistency strength,
seemingly in a linear fashion5. Salient is the following theorem:
Theorem 1. [Martin and Steel, 1989] If there are infinitely many Woodin
cardinals6 then PD holds.
Thus we see that PD is sensitive to the existence of large cardinals.7 By contrast,
we have the following theorem concerning CH:
2For details of Projective Determinacy, as well as other Determinacy Axioms, see [Jech, 2002] and
[Koellner and Woodin, 2010]. For the reader interested in the technical details: The kind of game in ques-
tion involves two players (denoted by ‘I’ and ‘II’) in a state of perfect information (i.e. both I and II
have infallible knowledge about past moves of the game). The game is played over some subset S of
ωω: the set of all infinite sequences of natural numbers. For the purposes of determinacy, ωω is used to
represent the set of all real numbers; since it is homeomorphic to the irrationals, one can simply prove
results about ωω and then transfer the theorems across using the homeomorphism. I and II takes turns
to play natural numbers against one another. After ω-many turns in this game, the players will have
generated a real number (let it be denoted by ‘r’). I is said to win if r ∈ S, and player II wins if
r 6∈ S. We can see that the possible moves allowed in a game are represented by a tree T , given by
the legitimate moves players may make at each successive point of the game, with a length ascribed to
each position of a play of the game p (denoted by ‘length(p)’). A strategy for player A is a function σ
with domain {p ∈ T |[length(p) is even and p is not a terminal element of T ]} such that σ(p) is always a
legal move for A in T . Similarly we can define the notion of a strategy for B as a function τ with domain
{p ∈ T |[length(p) is odd and p is not a terminal element of T ]} such that τ(p) is always a legal move for
A in T . A winning strategy for playerX is a strategy pi forX such thatX wins every game consistent with
pi. A set of reals is said to be determined iff one of the two players has a winning strategy. The projective
sets are sets of reals obtained from the operations of complementation and projection from closed subsets
of (ωω)n for n ∈ ω. Thus, PD states that whenever the subset S over which the game is being played is
projective, then one of the two players has a winning strategy.
3An excellent review of some of the options is discussed in [Maddy, 1988a] and [Maddy, 1988b].
4Of course, large cardinal axioms themselves constitute a significant and interesting area of indepen-
dence from ZFC. While we provide some remarks later concerning large cardinals and mathematical
explanation, we are largely interested here in independence low in the cumulative hierarchy.
5While all evidence points in this direction, nonetheless, due to the informal nature of the notion of
large cardinal axiom, no a priori proof of this claim is possible.
6A cardinal κ is Woodin iff for all A ⊆ Vκ, there are arbitrarily large α < κ such that for all β < κ there
exists an elementary embedding j : V −→ M with critical point α, such that j(α) > β, Vβ ⊆ M , and
A ∩ Vβ = A ∩ j(Vβ).
7In fact this sensitivity is shared by several other statements of second-order arithmetic at the level
of Vω+1 (for example ADL(R)), in contrast to third-order arithmetic (which inhabits Vω+2). See
[Koellner and Woodin, 2010] for details.
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Theorem 2. [Le´vy and Solovay, 1967] LetM be a model of set theory and
κ be measurable8. Then there are forcing extensions ofM in which CH is
true and others in which CH is false but κ remains measurable.
The above theorem shows that known large cardinal hypotheses cannot be used
to settle the truth value of CH in the manner of PD. This is because, no matter how
many large cardinals we have, we are able to use a relatively mild small forcing
to modify the truth value of CH, whilst leaving the large cardinal properties intact.
As we shall see, this difference will prove to be relevant. Many scholars feel that
this difference between PD and CH means that we are in a very different epistemic
position with respect to each.9
2 Multiversism and Pluralism
Independence has motivated several theories concerning how we should under-
stand the subject matter of set theory. Central to our discussion will be the following
two positions:
Multiversism is the view that there are many universes of set theory, no
one of which is ontologically privileged. Any universe of sets can be
extended to a larger universe.
Universism is the view that there is a single, unique, maximal universe of
set-theoretic discourse.
often Multiversism is seen as linked to the following position.
Pluralism is the view that we should investigate many different set theo-
ries, and no one is foundationally privileged in the sense that we conduct
foundational inquiry in different theories at different times.
Multiversism and Pluralism appear to be naturally linked. If we are Multiversists
and believe that there are a variety of universes, each of which satisfies some theory
or other and is on an ontologically equal footing, then we are likely to hold that the
theory of sets we adopt is underdetermined. We can operate within any particular
legitimate universe, using the theory that one finds there as our foundation. For
example, Hamkins writes:
“The multiverse view does not abandon the goal of using set theory as an
epistemological and ontological foundation for mathematics, for we ex-
pect to find all our familiar mathematical objects, such as the integer ring,
the real field and our favorite topological spaces, inside any one of the
universes of the multiverse. On the multiverse view, set theory remains
a foundation for the classical mathematical enterprise. The difference is
that when a mathematical issue is revealed to have a set-theoretic depen-
dence, as in the independence results, then the multiverse response is a
careful explanation that the mathematical fact of the matter depends on
which concept of set is used, and this is almost always a very interesting
situation, in which one may weigh the desirability of various set-theoretic
8A cardinal κ is measurable iff it is the critical point of a non-trivial elementary embedding
j : V −→ M. It is the weakest kind of cardinal defined by an elementary embedding from V to an
inner model thereof.
9See, for example, [Maddy, 2011] and [Koellner, 2006].
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hypotheses with their mathematical consequences.” ([Hamkins, 2012],
p419)
Thus, Hamkins has a position where we can operate in any one of a number
of different universes of sets. Despite the fact that many of these universes satisfy
different theories, we can nonetheless use them as foundational as all the relevant
objects studied by the ‘ordinary’ mathematician appear there.
While someone who believes in the existence of a single, unique, maximal uni-
verse of sets might well be interested in a diversity of different theories, they nonethe-
less hold that there is a fact of the matter concerning which one is true. Thus, they
might think that they should be interested in cutting down the theories available
(eventually focussing on one such) in order to get closer to a better account of the
truth value of independent sentences. As we shall see, a study of how we are ig-
norant of sentences independent from ZFC reveals that this methodology is mis-
guided. In order to understand the Universe of sets better, and strengthen the case
for one’s own favourite theory of sets, it is fruitful pursue a wide variety of other foun-
dational theories.
3 Varieties of ignorance
Let us take stock. We have seen that several authors regard our epistemic limitations
concerning sets as indicative of the existence of a multiverse of sets rather than a sin-
gle universe thereof. This link merits examination. Most philosophers have focussed
on what it would take to come to know (or, more minimally, be justified in asserting
that) CH. For example, Maddy writes:
“The question of how the unproven can be justified is especially press-
ing in current set theory, where the search is on for new axioms to deter-
mine the size of the continuum. This pressing problem is also the deepest
that contemporary mathematics presents to the contemporary philoso-
pher of mathematics. Not only would progress towards understanding
the process of mathematical hypothesis formation and confirmation con-
tribute to our philosophical understanding of the nature of mathematics,
it might even be of help and solace to those mathematicians actively en-
gaged in the axiom search.” ([Maddy, 1988a], p482)
arguing that we should analyse the process of confirmation and justification. Her
ideas are developed further in [Maddy, 1990], [Maddy, 1997], [Maddy, 2007], [Maddy, 2011],
and similar ideas have also been taken up by Koellner and Woodin in [Koellner, 2006]
and [Koellner and Woodin, 2010]. In the opposite direction, Hamkins argues that
any attempt to come to know or justify CH is doomed to fail:
“I claim that our extensive experience in the set-theoretic worlds in which
CH is true and others in which CH is false prevents us from looking upon
any statement settling CH as being a natural set-theoretic truth. We sim-
ply have had too much experience by now with the contrary situation.”
([Hamkins, 2015], p135)
Hamkins’ point is thus that the use of various model-theoretic constructions in
proving independence results facilitates an ability to understand what it is like to
reason in those worlds. This then prevents any widespread acceptance of CH; as
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soon as an axiom is shown to imply CH or its negation, its naturalness is immediately
vitiated by excluding prima facie natural set-theoretic universes.
Whilst most philosophers have focussed on the back and forth of this debate,
and what it would take to come to know or justify independent sentences, a positive
account of our ignorance appears lacking. The issue is especially relevant given the
advances in the philosophical study of ignorance that have been made over the last
30 years. Before we embark on a more detailed analysis of the agnotological status of
independent sentences, we first provide a brief exposition of the relevant literature
necessary for our arguments.10
The first kind of ignorance we shall consider is that of conscious ignorance. Such
ignorance concerns questions11 to which we do not know the answers, but we nonethe-
less know that we do not know. Such questions are typically the targets of our inves-
tigations (both scientific and otherwise). Good examples (from my own extensive
ignorance database) include:
(1.) I do not know how many miles my dad’s car has on the clock.
(2.) I do not know what parts of category theory were used in the first
proofs of Fermat’s Last Theorem.
(3.) As of the year 2010, I did not know whether or not there were Higgs
bosons.
(4.) I do not know whether or not there are infinitely many twin primes.
Each case has a number of differences. (1.) I do not know, simply because I
do not find the question especially interesting. Despite this, I could easily verify it
(say by checking his odometer next time I get a lift). (2.) I do not know, however,
presumably with enough time and effort I could learn the required mathematics, and
there definitely are people who do know. (3.) and (4.) are both no fault of mine, but
I do know what would constitute/would have constituted a solution in a particular
direction in each case (namely an observation of the relevant particle at CERN for
the Higgs boson, and a peer-reviewed proof for the Twin Prime Conjecture).
Despite these vagaries in kinds of ignorance, however, I do know (i) that I do
not know the answer to a particular question, and (ii) roughly what it would take to
have an answer. Thus my ignorance is conscious: I know about it, and can investigate
accordingly.12 More precisely, we can follow [Bromberger, 1992] in providing neces-
sary conditions on ignorance of an agent A with respect to some research question
Q:
(A) A is able to articulate Q in a language in which she is competent and
is aware of Q.
(B) A does not know the answer to Q.
(C) Q admits of a single correct answer.
(D) A believes that she does not know the correct answer to Q.
(E) A believes that Q has a correct answer.
10An excellent introduction and survey is available in [Wilholt, F].
11Ignorance is often formulated as directed towards research questions rather than propositions in order
to avoid thorny issues surrounding Meno’s paradox. See [Wilholt, F] for discussion.
12The examples of (3.) and (4.) are somewhat subtle in that for practical reasons I have to rely on the
expertise of others to provide verification. However, should I be inclined to, I could (in some appropriate
modal sense) try and investigate the issue, and know what would constitute a solution in each case. For
example, I could give up philosophy tomorrow and begin to attempt to prove the Twin Prime Conjecture.
5
Conscious ignorance can come in different flavours, however. Consider, for ex-
ample, the following question:
(5.) What happens when an object goes into a black hole?
I am consciously ignorant of this question. My lack of ignorance is especially
interesting, however, in that it plausibly displays the following two features:13
A is in a p-predicament with regard to Q if and only if, in A’s views, Q
admits of a right answer, but A can think of no answer to which, in A’s
views, there are no decisive objections.
and
A is in a b-predicament with regard to Q if and only if the question is
sound, but the correct answer is beyond what the person can conceive or
articulate.
Why am I in a b-predicament and a p-predicament with respect to (5.)? Well, for
those explanations I understand concerning what happens when we observe some-
thing enter a black hole, I can think of good reasons to reject each. Every explanation
of which I am aware, I find deeply problematic on the basis of some gedanken ex-
periment or other. Thus I am in a p-predicament. However, I am also likely to be in
a b-predicament; whatever the correct explanation is, it is likely that, with my lim-
ited knowledge of esoteric theoretical physics, I am currently unable to compose or
understand the answer, even if someone directly tells me.
p-predicaments and b-predicaments are independent phenomena; any combina-
tion of them is possible. For example, though I might be in a b-predicament and
p-predicament with respect to the question of black holes, I am not in either position
with respect to the number of miles on the odometer of my dad’s car. I can think of
many plausible values, for which I do not have a robust reason to think false. More-
over, I will be able to articulate what the value will be: some relatively small natural
number. Returning again to the question of black holes, though I am probably in
both a b-predicament and a p-predicament, things could quite easily have been other-
wise. Suppose I think that the view that the surface of a black hole acts as a hologram
of its contents is at least plausible,14 and am not aware of the various gedanken ex-
periments that challenge such a view. Thus, I am not in a p-predicament: I can think
of no decisive objections against the view that the surface of a black hole behaves
like a hologram of its contents. However, I may very well still be in a b-predicament
(say if the actual answer turns out to be very complex). For the converse direction,
suppose that the holographic account of what happens when an object falls into a
black hole is actually correct. Then I would be in a p-predicament (I still regard the
holographic explanation as deeply problematic), but not a b-predicament, I can (just
about) cognise and formulate what happens when an object falls into a black hole.
When we are either in a p-predicament or b-predicament and consciously ignorant,
we will say that we are deeply consciously ignorant.15
In addition to conscious ignorance, we also have opaque ignorance. This concerns
questions to which we do not know the answer, and we also do not know that we do
13See [Bromberger, 1992], Ch. 2 for a fuller description of these kinds of phenomena, as well as
[Wilholt, F].
14See [Susskind, 1994] for an exposition of this fun idea.
15[Wilholt, F] reserves the use of the term ‘deep’ solely for cases when we find ourselves in a p-
predicament. As we shall see, b-predicaments will also be relevant here, so I will opt for a more liberal
usage.
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not know the answer. In each of the cases we will violate one of conditions (A), (C),
(D), or (E). We might be ignorant of the answer to question because we are unable
to articulate the question properly (and hence would find ourselves automatically
in a b-predicament as well). It might be that we fail to recognise that the question
does not admit of a correct answer. Alternatively, we might just be in a state of
error, believing that we have an answer to the question when actually our answer is
incorrect. Finally, we might regard Q as lacking a correct answer, when it actually
possesses one.
It should be noted that opacity does not necessarily imply depth. For example,
suppose that my dad’s car has 30’000 miles on the clock. Suppose further that I
snuck a quick glance at the odometer yesterday, however I misread the ‘3’ as a ‘2’,
and hence I believe that his car has done only 20’000 miles. What should we say
about this case? I am opaquely ignorant: I believe (wrongly) that there are 20’000
miles on the clock, violating (D). However, I am in neither a p-predicament nor
a b-predicament: I think there is an answer to which there are no good objections
(namely 20’000 miles), and I can perfectly well articulate the correct answer.16
4 What is our ignorance of independent sentences like?
The time has come to put the recent developments explained above to work in com-
ing to a better understanding of our ignorance of independent sentences. A Multi-
versist attacks the problem by using their view of ontology to dispel much of our
ignorance. Our knowledge concerning sentences such as CH consists in how they
behave across the Multiverse. Such a sentiment receives expression in the work of
Multiversists:
“On the multiverse view, consequently, the continuum hypothesis is a
settled question;it is incorrect to describe the CH as an open problem. The
answer to CH consists of the expansive, detailed knowledge set theorists
have gained about the extent to which it holds and fails in the multi-
verse, about how to achieve it or its negation in combination with other
diverse set-theoretic properties. Of course, there are and will always re-
main questions about whether one can achieve CH or its negation with
this or that hypothesis, but the point is that the most important and es-
sential facts about CH are deeply understood, and these facts constitute
the answer to the CH question.” ([Hamkins, 2012], p429)
Thus, for a liberal multiversist of Hamkins’ persuasion, while there is some ig-
norance regarding how CH behaves in certain models, largely speaking we have a
good deal of knowledge regarding CH.
The cases that we shall examine concern attitudes to CH and PD given the Uni-
versist’s picture of set-theoretic ontology.17 The first task is to settle on the research
question with which we are interested. The most immediate questions would be:
16Examples of this sort bear a resemblance to Gettier-style cases, but for the fact that the belief in ques-
tion is false. For example, if we modified the above example so that I still misread the ‘3’ as a ‘2’, but in fact
someone has wound the clock forward by 10’000 miles (so my dad’s car actually has done 20’000 miles),
we would arrive at a standard Gettier case: my belief is true, I have justification, but I cannot reasonably be
said to know. As we shall see, forms of mathematical Gettier-style situations (and the variety of ignorance
they engender) will be relevant for our arguments.
17There is a subtle question of how things go on multiversist pictures that are not as liberal as Hamkins’
(see, for example, [Steel, 2014] and [Arrigoni and Friedman, 2013]). Though an expansion of the project
should accommodate these cases, for the sake of argumentative clarity we choose to focus on the Univer-
sist position here.
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(6.) What is the value of the continuum?
(7.) Does every projective set of reals admit of a winning strategy?
However we can never be in either a p-predicament or b-predicament with respect
to (6.) or (7.). For (6.), we can articulate any value the continuum might take (and
so cannot be in a b-predicament), and also it is one of the main lessons of the inde-
pendence phenomenon that there are many values the continuum might take that
cannot be (currently) reasonably objected to (and so we are not in a p-predicament).
For (7.) we note that as a simple true or false question, we can easily articulate the
correct answer even if we do not know it (I just did), and again it is not the case
that both responses admit of strong seemingly defeating objections. Thus, our igno-
rance regarding either CH or PD themselves is shallow, and in itself cannot be used
in coming to understand CH or PD better. A reformulation of the requisite research
question is required in order to bring agnotology to bear. Fortunately, the above two
questions are not the only research questions involved in the project of justifying
new axioms for set theory. A famous quotation from Go¨del is helpful here:
“For if the meanings of the primitive terms of set theory...are accepted
as sound, it follows that the set-theoretical concepts and theorems de-
scribe some well-determined reality, in which Cantor’s conjecture must
be either true or false. Hence its undecidability from the axioms being as-
sumed today can only mean that these axioms do not contain a complete
description of that reality. Such a belief is by no means chimerical, since
it is possible to point out ways in which the decision of a question, which
is undecidable from the usual axioms, might nevertheless be obtained.”
([Go¨del, 1964], p260)
Important to Go¨del’s argument, and indeed subsequent discussions of the justi-
fication of new axioms of set theory, is that we desire some way of achieving a more
complete description of the Universe. How can this be done? Discussing certain
axioms, Go¨del writes:
“These axioms show clearly, not only that the axiomatic system of set
theory as used today is incomplete, but also that it can be supplemented
without arbitrariness by new axioms which only unfold the content of
the concept of set explained above.” ([Go¨del, 1964], pp260-261)
justifications then, for Go¨del, should respond to some feature of the universe of sets.
It is this feature of the Universe of sets, that explains18 why the continuum has the
value it does, or why every projective set of reals admits of a winning strategy. This
focus on explanation indeed, is partly in the target of [Bromberger, 1992]’s analysis
of p-predicaments and b-predicaments. Thus we may phrase our question (schemat-
ically) as follows:
(8.) Let φ be some set-theoretic sentence independent from ZFC. What
feature (suitably axiomatised) of the universe of sets explains which of φ
and ¬φ is true?
Now, we can be in either a p-predicament or b-predicament with respect to this
question. Let us consider each of CH and PD in turn. Of course, one’s ignorance of
18It is, of course, an exceptionally tricky issue how to provide a full account of mathematical explana-
tion. We shall set this issue aside here.
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(or indeed lack thereof) CH and PD is dependent upon the attitudes and epistemic
features of the agent in question. A salient problem here, is that we can only examine
ignorance with respect to an individual set theorist, and finding consensus across the
community is difficult. We will, therefore, examine the different ways that ignorance
may play out, and what should be said in each case.
A very important difference between the two principles, is that PD is at least
claimed to be known (or at least believed with a high degree of credence) by several
set theorists and philosophers. The fact that large cardinals imply determinacy ax-
ioms, and that determinacy axioms imply the existence of inner models with large
cardinals has been seen by several authors19 as good evidence for the truth of PD.
So, as an answer to (8.), many set theorists believe that:
(8.A) The network of results between determinacy axioms and Woodin
cardinals is good evidence for the truth of certain large cardinal axioms,
and the fact that the universe supports these cardinals explains why PD
is true.
It is a difficult question whether or not such set theorists would claim to know
the truth value of PD. In what follows, to make our arguments clear, we will simply
assume this.20 The situation with CH is markedly different. Though there are various
projects aiming at finding a resolution of the continuum problem, few set theorists
would claim that they know the answer.
Suppose then that φ is one of CH or PD, and that the agent does not believe
that she knows the answer to what explains whether or not φ. Might we be in a
p-predicament with respect to the explanation of φ?
The answer will depend on the extent to which one views the extant resolutions
of φ as admitting defeating counter arguments. I think, however, it is fair to say
that each of the competing resolutions of CH or PD might be true. It would seem
like a highly pessimistic agent to say that each admits of defeating objections in her
eyes. Thus, while it is possible that we are in a p-predicament, it is possibly the less
interesting of the two phenomena.
We may very well be in a b-predicament with respect to (8.), however. It is en-
tirely plausible that the resolution to an independent sentence requires substantial
additional conceptual machinery, one that it might not be possible for us to articu-
late given our current epistemic situation. Thus, especially with respect to CH, the
possibility of a b-predicament should both be acknowledged and examined.
Suppose on the other hand that the agent believes that she does know the answer
with respect to (8.) and either CH or PD holds (though, as noted above, it is more
likely that PD is the target here). In that case, she may be correct, and (8.) might
indeed be her preferred explanation for the truth of the relevant φ. However, in
this situation, one can still envisage that the person might be wrong that they know
the sentence, say if the sentence holds but the universe does not conform to their
desired explanation. Here, the agent is in a variety of Gettier-style situation with
respect to PD (or CH). The relevant sentence is true but their justification is defective
(in that their explanation makes false claims about the universe). It is thus in their
beliefs about their justifications and explanations where the ignorance lies.21 In such a
19See [Koellner and Woodin, 2010] for a survey of this literature.
20We could have, instead, just moved to the nearest possible world at which the agent does believe that
she knows in order to examine the case there.
21The example is interesting in its own right, as it creates problems for accounts of knowledge that
make use of possible worlds. For, many such accounts make use of a sensitivity constraint: in possible
worlds in which the sentence is false, the agent does not believe it. However, on the widely held view
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situation, they would be opaquely ignorant. Moreover, they may well find themselves
in a b-predicament: the answer to the research question might be beyond what the
agent can conceive. Indeed, if we are generous to set theorists and philosophers
of set theory, we might think that should a truly correct and compelling answer be
discovered, it will ultimately be accepted.
Thus, we see that within the Universist’s framework there are several options.
For a given independent sentence φ, and question of the form of (8.), we might be
in one of the following three situations: either (i) we know the answer to (8.), (ii)
our ignorance is either conscious, or (iii) we are opaquely ignorant in virtue of hold-
ing a misplaced confidence in our erroneous reasons for holding φ true. Assuming
that we are in fact ignorant (so in cases (i) or (ii)), there is then the separate ques-
tion of whether or not we are in a b-predicament with respect to the independent
sentence. Moreover, in both the case of (ii) and (iii), there are reasons to think that a
b-predicament is at least possible, if not likely.
5 How ignorance affects Pluralism
Let us return to the case of PD. One might think that we should be, on a Univer-
sist’s picture, in a less pernicious epistemic situation with PD compared to CH. We
have the Martin-Steel Theorem that PD follows from the existence of infinitely many
Woodin cardinals, and also know that axioms of definable determinacy reverse to
yield inner models of the large cardinals. We seem to have a wealth of information
in the case of PD that is not possessed in the CH case.
Note, however, that we are more likely to be opaquely ignorant with respect to PD,
given the Martin-Steel Theorem. If it turns out that there are not the requisite Woodin
cardinals (let’s say the existence of a Woodin cardinal turns out to be inconsistent),
yet we are currently staunch adherents to the view that PD holds in virtue of the ex-
istence of infinitely many Woodin cardinals, then we would, as agents, be opaquely
ignorant in virtue of erroneously holding ourselves to be knowers. This goes for
other programmes or traditions too. It might simply turn out that the tradition in
which the agent is steeped is simply not correct concerning V , yielding opaque ig-
norance (assuming, of course, that they have not rebelled against their tradition!). In
fact, the mere existence of incompatible foundational set-theoretic programmes, im-
plies (assuming that there are at least some who take themselves to know on each
side) that there must be such opaque ignorance for some agents. In contrast, as-
suming that we are consciously ignorant of (8.) with respect to some sentence, we
may very well hold that the correct explanation is not something we can currently
articulate.
The key fact to note is that in each case, determining whether or not one is in a
b-predicament is key, and if we are in a b-predicament investigation and resolution
of our b-predicament aids in the search for new axioms. In the case of PD, part of
shoring up our confidence in PD on the basis of infinitely many Woodin cardinals
is determining that there is not some hitherto unrecognised aspect of the Universe
of sets that vitiates our explanation. Similarly, one might think that with respect to
why CH or ¬CH holds, we are likely to be in a b-predicament. The only way this b-
predicament can be rectified is by developing and working within new foundational
proposals. The importance of determining our b-predicaments with respect to set
that mathematical objects exist out of necessity if at all, it is difficult to make sense of this requirement.
For, on the assumption that that a mathematical sentence φ is true (or false) there are no possible worlds
in which φ is false (or true).
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theory is thus important for engaging in the justificatory process. For, if we believe
that we know why φ holds, then analysing alternative pictures in detail helps to rule
them out and narrows the chance of there being a hitherto unrecognised aspect of
the universe of sets, and if we think that we do not know whether or not φ, it is
entirely plausible that we are in a b-predicament and so should be open to new and
revolutionary set-theoretic axioms. This sort of process is one to which agnotologists
are sensitive:
“Here are some examples of such questions that have at some point played
a role in periods of massive theoretical and conceptual change: “What
would we observe if we chased alongside a light beam at the speed of
light?”, “Under what conditions are two events that occur at different
points in space simultaneous?”, “What happens when two freely falling
heavy bodies are connected in mid-fall?”, “Why does the electron in an
H atom not spiral into the core, emitting radiation of greater and greater
frequency?” These questions were, I submit, understandable even be-
fore the respective episodes of revolutionary change that they are as-
sociated with had occurred. It was in taking them seriously and pur-
suing them (amongst other questions) that Einstein, Galileo and Bohr
encountered deep-seated problems which led them to attempt radical
theoretical-conceptual adjustments. These adjustments, in turn, enabled
them to pursue other, novel questions, thus opening up whole new ar-
eas of conscious ignorance that had been thoroughly opaque before.”
([Wilholt, F], pp16-17)
The point is that by analysing our b-predicaments and removing them, we can
come to fruitful conceptual change, converting much opaque ignorance into con-
scious ignorance. Importantly however, this conversion is not just intrinsically inter-
esting, but also helps inform our confidence in our currently held beliefs. For example,
suppose that a new set theoretic principle Ψ is proposed, one which both seems nat-
ural and to which we were previously in a b-predicament. Suppose this principle
also has the property that it implies PD and reverses to inner models of large cardi-
nals. This increases our confidence in our explanation of the truth of PD; areas of
opaque ignorance towards which we were previously in a b-predicament turn out to
mesh nicely with our overall picture. Suppose on the other hand that there are some
phenomena we wish to explain and Ψ seems both natural and implies these data.
We come to hold the belief that Ψ explains the phenomena and we were previously
in a b-predicament with respect to this fact. However, suppose that it then turns out
that Ψ implies that there are no Woodin cardinals. Our initial picture of the explana-
tion and justification of PD would be disconfirmed, and might lead us to reform our
epistemological and agnotological stance towards PD and its explanation.
What is the pluralistic upshot? Simply that much of philosophical discourse con-
cerning set theory has been in promotion of one or other conception of the nature
of the set-theoretic universe, to the possible detriment of other projects and founda-
tional theory. Our analysis questions the extent to which this is a fruitful22 method-
ology. Certainly views have to be defended against objections, and often doing so
is the best way of filling them out in full detail. If, however, this is pursued solely
for the promotion of one set of axioms over others we run into two difficulties. First,
as discussed above, even if one has a favourite position concerning the nature of
22The concept of fruitfulness has been the focus of a good deal of recent work in the philosophy of
mathematics recently (such as in [Tappenden, 2008] and [Maddy, 2011]). We do not mean anything too
deep (or precise) by the term: simply that this methodology might not be the best or most effective.
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the universe of sets, the study of alternative frameworks helps to reassure oneself
that one is not in an erroneous opaque b-predicament with respect to the view. Sec-
ondly, the resolution of b-predicaments in a manner compatible with one’s position re-
sults in truly novel observations concerning V , thereby helping one to better situate
one’s position. However, in coming to a resolution of a b-predicament, even one
that ends up being resolved in a manner compatible with one’s own view, we may
require a period of toleration of other foundational systems in tension with one’s cur-
rent position. After all, it is precisely the nature of b-predicaments that we cannot
yet formulate the relevant solution. Exploration of these issues thus requires novel
techniques, some of which may conflict with our own view whilst being necessary
to see the shape of a solution. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, one’s own view can be
strengthened (both through understanding our knowledge/ignorance and our level
of confidence in our justifications/explanations) by adopting a Pluralism towards
foundational theory in order to draw out the contents of different ways of looking
at the universe. The development of alternative frameworks yields information about
one’s own preferred theory (indeed many other theories), and helps us to tell a better
story of how different axiom systems stand with respect to confirmation. Fixation
on a single theory masks this useful information, and obscures possible unorthodox
pioneering insights.
Conclusion
Let us take stock. We identified in §1 two main kinds of independence from ZFC;
those for which we believe we have a well-justified response (using large cardinals)
and those which we find more perplexing. We then argued in §2 that often Mul-
tiversism and Pluralism are linked. In §3 we reviewed some of the agnotological
literature and noted the difference between conscious ignorance, opaque ignorance,
articulated through the notions of p-predicaments and b-predicaments. In §4 we pro-
vided an analysis of how we might be ignorant of explanations of the truth or falsity
of sentences independent from ZFC. We argued that our ignorance may be either
opaque or conscious, shallow or deep depending on the agent. It was also argued,
however, that b-predicaments could have a special role to play in our understanding
of independence; through examining our b-predicaments we both shore up held be-
liefs and attack our conscious ignorance effectively. This focus on the possibility of
b-predicaments motivates a pluralism about foundational theory23, even on a Uni-
versist understanding of the subject matter of set theory. While the Universist may
think that one theory is true, the adoption of different foundational theories is an
effective way of yielding epistemological information about each.
We close with a remark concerning directions for future research. While it has
been argued that the Universist has some reason to accept Pluralism, it remains to
be seen how independence relates to the study of ignorance on other ontological
frameworks (e.g. the various species of Multiversism). Moreover, we selected the
two very narrow cases of PD and CH, a full examination of our ignorance of other
kinds of independence (such as the independence of large cardinals) may also be in
order. For the moment, however, it seems that the philosophical study of ignorance
has interesting insights for the search for new axioms in set theory.
23There is a very deep question here, one we do not have the space to address, of how agnotology
might inform Pluralism concerning the language in which we express our foundational theory. We might
consider, for example, whether agnotology has any implications for the ‘debate’ between set-theoretic,
category-theoretic, and homotopy-type-theoretic foundations.
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